Decreasing absolute risk aversion: some clarification by Abouda, Moez
Decreasing absolute risk aversion: some clarification
Moez Abouda
To cite this version:
Moez Abouda. Decreasing absolute risk aversion: some clarification. Documents de travail du
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2008.24 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2008. <halshs-00270648>
HAL Id: halshs-00270648
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00270648
Submitted on 7 Apr 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Documents de Travail du
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13
http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/CES-docs.htm
ISSN : 1955-611X









La Vallée (1968)[12], in the expected utility model, gives a suﬃcient condition for
positivity of the bid-selling spread. In this article, we show that this suﬃcient condition,
namely decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) is in fact necessary. Moreover, we
prove that the expected utility hypothesis and diﬀerentiability of the utility function
are not required.
Keywords: DARA, NARA, Bid-selling spread, Perfect hedging, Risk premium.
JEL classiﬁcation: D80-D81-G12.
1 Introduction
The paper is organized as follows. First we deﬁne buying, selling and ask(short
selling) prices of assets in the spirit of La Vallée (1968)[12] (see also Abouda
and Chateauneuf(2002)[1]) and then we give some useful properties for general
preferences and their relationship with weak risk aversion.
In a previous paper, Abouda and Chateauneuf (2002)[1] proved, in Yaari's
model, that positivity of the bid-ask spread can be characterized by a very weak
form of risk aversion SMRA (symmetrical monotone risk aversion) and by pref-
erence for perfect hedging. We give two new deﬁnitions of preference for perfect
hedging then we prove in a very general model that it is weaker than weak risk
aversion. A weak risk averse decision-maker is usually deﬁned as one who, for
every bounded random variable, prefers the expectation of the random variable
to the random variable itself. Then, we show that for positive assets, positiv-
ity of the bid-selling spread is merely characterized by the non increasingness
of absolute risk aversion. Let us point out that suﬃciency of this condition, in
the expected utility model, has been proved by La Vallée (1968)[12] and that in
the present paper we prove that this condition is also necessary and in a general
model.
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2 Notation and deﬁnitions
2.1 Framework
We consider a decision-maker faced with choices among risky assets X, the set V
of such assets consisting of all bounded real random variables deﬁned on a prob-
ability space (S,A, P ) assumed to be suﬃciently rich to generate any bounded
real-valued random variable. S is the set of states of nature, A is a σ-algebra
of events (i.e. of subsets of S), and P is a σ-additive non-atomic probability
measure. Let V0 containing only discrete elements of V .
Let  be the preference relation (i.e. a nontrivial weak order) over V of a decision
maker. The relation  is then transitive and complete. The relation  is said
to be nontrivial if there exists X and Y ∈ V such that X  Y ; complete
if ∀X, Y ∈ V , X  Y or Y  X and transitive if ∀X, Y, Z ∈ V , X  Y and
Y  Z ⇒ X  Z.
Thus for any pair of assets X, Y , X  Y means that X is weakly preferred to Y
by the DM, X  Y means that X is strictly preferred to Y , and X ∼ Y means
that X and Y are considered equivalent by the DM.
First we state three axioms which are usual and natural requirements, whatever
the attitude towards risk may be.
(A.1)  respects ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
i.e.: ∀X, Y ∈ V , [P (X ≥ t) ≥ P (Y ≥ t) ; ∀t ∈ IR] 1 ⇒ X  Y
(A.2) Continuity with respect to monotone uniform convergence
i.e.: ∀Xn, X, Y ∈ V
[Xn ↓u X, Xn  Y ∀n] 2 ⇒ X  Y
[Xn ↑u X, Xn  Y ∀n] ⇒ X  Y
(A.3) Monotonicity
[X ≥ Y + ε.S, ε > 0] 3 ⇒ X  Y
Both the EU model and the RDEU model satisfy all the previous assump-
tions on . Furthermore it is straightforward that under the previous axioms,
every asset X admits a certainty equivalent c(X) ∈ IR, where c : V → IR is
1X dominates Y w.r.t. ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance will be denoted X FSD Y in the
sequel.
2Xn ↓u X (resp Xn ↑u X) means that Xn is a monotonic decreasing (resp. monotonic
increasing) sequence converging uniformly to X.
3For A ∈ A, De Finetti's use of A to denote the characteristic function of A [A(s) = 1 if
s ∈ A, A(s) = 0 if s /∈ A] will be adopted.
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monotone, monotonously continuous, respects ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
and represents the preference relation . Namely, one gets:
Lemma 2.1. Under axioms A1-A3, a preference relation  is such that for every
asset X, there exists a unique real number c(X) to be referred to as the certainty
equivalent of X : X ∼ c(X).S, where c(.) satisﬁes : X  Y ⇔ c(X) ≥ c(Y )
X ≥ Y ⇒ c(X) ≥ c(Y ) and X ≥ Y + ε.S, ε > 0⇒ c(X) > c(Y )
Xn, X, Y ∈ V Xn ↓u X ⇒ c(Xn) ↓ c(X) ; Xn ↑u X ⇒ c(Xn) ↑ c(X)
X FSD Y ⇒ c(X) ≥ c(Y ).
When there is no ambiguity we will note a constant random variable by the
constant itself. See for example the footnote in deﬁnition 2.2.
2.2 Deﬁnitions and properties
The deﬁnitions and properties below are given independently of any model. We
begin by deﬁning some risk aversions then bid, ask and selling prices.
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the notion of weak risk aversion which is based on the
comparison between the asset X and its mathematical expectation E(X).
Deﬁnition 2.2. [Arrow(1965)[4], Pratt(1964)[13]]
A decision-maker is weakly risk averse if he always prefers the mathematical ex-
pectation E(X) of the asset X to the asset itself.
i.e. ∀X ∈ V, E(X)  X.4
Pratt (1964)[13] has deﬁned the Arrow-Pratt risk premium :
Deﬁnition 2.3. The Risk premium pi(W,X) is the amount such that:
W+X ∼ W+E(X)−pi(W,X). This means that pi(W,X) is the maximal amount,
the decision-maker would accept to pay to get the sure amount E(X) instead of
the risky asset X when he has a sure initial wealth W ∈ IR.
By deﬁnition 2.2 and 2.3 we have the property 2.4 below :
Property 2.4. A decision-maker is weakly risk averse if and only if he exhibits
a positive risk premium.
4E(X) is short for E(X).S∗ where S∗ is the sure asset which gives 1 in all the states of
nature.
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Abouda and Chateauneuf (2002)[1] have introduced a new aversion called
preference for perfect hedging (or, alternately attraction for certainty)
Deﬁnition 2.5. A DM is said to be attracted by perfect hedging if:
[X, Y ∈ V,X  Y, α ∈ [0, 1], αX + (1− α)Y = a, a ∈ IR] ⇒ a  Y .
By proposition 3.1 we will deﬁne attraction for perfect hedging indiﬀerently
by (i) or (ii) or (iii) and property 3.3 gives the relation between weak risk aversion
and attraction for perfect hedging.
The most commonly used formulation of decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA) is due to Pratt (1964)[13] and Arrow (1965)[4]. Let us deﬁne DARA as
the standard property :
Deﬁnition 2.6. A decision-maker is said to be DARA if :
Let us consider a non trivial asset X ∈ V and let C ∈ IR be the certainly equivalent
of X : X ∼ C. Then ∀k > 0, X + k  C + k.
We deﬁne also nonincreasing absolute risk aversion (NARA) by changing in
deﬁnition 2.6  by .
Let us assume that our decision-maker is endowed with a sure initial wealth
W ∈ IR, and aims at evaluating his personal buying and selling price (b(W,X)
and s(W,X)) for a given asset X.
Following La Vallée (1968)[12], the following deﬁnitions can be stated:
Deﬁnition 2.7. The buying(or bid ) price b(W,X) of asset X is deﬁned by :
W ∼ W +X − b(W,X).
For favorable assets, i.e. for assets X such that b(W,X) > 0, the buying price
is the maximum amount the decision-maker accepts to pay in order to obtain X
but for unfavorable assets, |b(W,X)| is the minimum amount the decision-maker
accepts to get in order to accept the risk X.
Let us now deﬁne the selling price.
Deﬁnition 2.8. The selling price s(W,X) of asset X is deﬁned by :
W +X ∼ W + s(W,X).
According to Pratt (1964)[13] the selling price is sometimes called the cash
equivalent or the value of X which is the sure amount the decision-maker is
indiﬀerent between receiving it and receiving X when he has a sure initial wealth
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W ∈ IR. So for favorable assets, the selling price is the minimum amount the
decision-maker accepts to get in order to sell X when he has it but for unfavorable
assets, |s(W,X)| is the maximum amount the decision-maker accepts to pay in
order to be insured against the risk X.
We can deﬁne also the short selling price as in Abouda and Chateauneuf
(2002)[1]:
Deﬁnition 2.9. The ask(or short selling ) price a(W,X) of asset X is deﬁned
by : W ∼ W −X + a(W,X).
For sake of completeness, as in La Vallée (1968)[12] and Pratt (1964)[13] in
the expected utility framework, let us give some elementary properties linking
these deﬁnitions:
Property 2.10. ∀W ∈ IR and X ∈ V we have
s(W,X) = E(X)− pi(W,X) (1)
a(W,X) = −b(W,−X) (2)
b(W,X) = s(W − b(W,X), X) (3)
s(W,X) = b(W + s(W,X), X) (4)
Proof.
. (1) holds easily by deﬁnition 2.3 and deﬁnition 2.8.
. (2) holds easily by deﬁnition 2.7 and deﬁnition 2.9.
. Deﬁnition 2.7 gives W ∼ (W − b(W,X)) + X and deﬁnition 2.8 gives
(W−b(W,X))+X ∼ (W−b(W,X))+s(W−b(W,X), X) so we have by transitivity
of ∼ and strict monotony of  that b(W,X) = s(W − b(W,X), X) so (3) holds.
. Deﬁnition 2.8 gives (W+s(W,X))+X−s(W,X) ∼ W+s(W,X) and deﬁ-
nition 2.7 givesW+s(W,X) ∼ (W+s(W,X))+X−b(W+s(W,X), X) so we have
by transitivity of ∼ and strict monotony of  that s(W,X) = b(W +s(W,X), X)
so (4) holds.
We get easily by strict monotony and deﬁnitions 2.3, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 the
property below:
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Property 2.11. ∀k,W ∈ IR and X ∈ V we have
pi(W + k,X − k) = pi(W,X) (5)
s(W − k,X + k) = s(W,X) + k (6)
b(W,X + k) = b(W,X) + k (7)
a(W,X + k) = a(W,X) + k (8)
Property 2.12.
Let W ∈ IR and X ∈ V , the following assertions are equivalent:
(a) b(W,X) ≤ s(W,X).
(b) pi(W,X) ≤ pi(W − b(W,X), X)
Proof.
Thanks to assertion (3) of property 2.10, (a) is equivalent to s(W−b(W,X), X) ≤
s(W,X) which is equivalent by (1) of property 2.10 to (b).
Property 2.13.
∀W ∈ IR and X ∈ V , s(W,X) and b(W,X) have the same sign.
Proof.
s(W,X) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ W + s(W,X)  W
⇐⇒ W +X  W (definition2.8)
⇐⇒ W +X  W +X − b(W,X) (definition2.7)
⇐⇒ b(W,X) ≥ 0
On the other hand, we get easily s(W,X) = 0 ⇐⇒ b(W,X) = 0 thanks to (3)
and (4) in property 2.10.
Remark 2.14. Note that the bid and the ask prices need not have the same sign.
Example 2.15 below gives for some X ∈ V b(W,X) < 0 and a(W,X) > 0.
Example 2.15. Take the Yaari's model characterized by the probability perception
function f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] s.t. f(p) = p2,∀p ∈ [0, 1].
Let a discrete random variable X with probability law L(X) = (x1, p1;x2, p2),
where x1 < x2 we have I(X) = x1 + f(p2)(x2 − x1). In Abouda and Chateauneuf
6
(2002)[1] it is shown that in Yaari's model, b(W,X) = I(X) and a(W,X) =
−I(−X).
Take x1 = −9, x2 = 9, p1 = 13 and p2 = 23 .
In this example we get b(W,X) = −1 and a(W,X) = 7.
3 Preference for perfect hedging and weak risk
aversion
Before giving a characterization of weak risk aversion by selling and buying prices,
let survey preference for perfect hedging where we prove that is weaker than weak
risk aversion.
3.1 Preference for perfect hedging
Proposition 3.1 below give three deﬁnitions5 of preference for perfect hedging :
Proposition 3.1. The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) [X, Y ∈ V, α ∈ [0, 1], αX + (1− α)Y = a.S, a ∈ IR] ⇒ a.S  X or Y .
(ii) [X, Y ∈ V,X  Y, α ∈ [0, 1], αX + (1− α)Y = a.S, a ∈ IR] ⇒ a.S  Y .
(iii) [X, Y ∈ V,X ∼ Y, α ∈ [0, 1], αX + (1− α)Y = a.S, a ∈ IR] ⇒ a.S  Y .
Proof.
. It is clear that (i)⇒ (ii)⇒ (iii)
. (iii)⇒ (i)
Let X, Y ∈ V and α ∈ [0, 1] / αX + (1− α)Y = a.S
We can suppose that X  Y (otherwise we interchange X and Y ).
Let c ≤ 0 / X + c ∼ Y . We have α(X + c) + (1− α)Y = (αc+ a).S than by (iii)
(αc+ a).S  Y than a.S  Y . (Because αc ≤ 0)
Remark 3.2. Preference for perfect hedging means that if the decision maker can
attain certainty by a convex combination of two assets, then he prefers certainty
to one of these assets.
5(ii) of the proposition 3.1 is the initial deﬁnition given in Abouda and Chateauneuf (2002)[1]
of preference for perfect hedging.
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Let us now prove that preference for perfect hedging is weaker than weak risk
aversion.
Theorem 3.3. Weak risk aversion ⇒ Preference for perfect hedging
Proof.
Let X ∼ Y and α / αX + (1− α)Y = a.S
By hypothesis E(X).S  X and E(Y ).S  Y then
min(E(X), E(Y )).S  Y (9)
We have a = αE(X) + (1− α)E(Y ) ≥ min(E(X), E(Y )) then
a.S  min(E(X), E(Y )).S (10)
(9) and (10) ⇒ a.S  Y , hence (iii) of proposition 3.1 is satisﬁed.
Remark 3.4. Note that the converse of property 3.3 is false. In Yaari's model for
example Abouda and Chateauneuf (2002)[1] have shown that we have preference
for perfect hedging if and only if f(p) + f(1− p) ≤ 1, ∀p ∈ [0, 1] which is weaker
than weak risk aversion characterized in this model by f(p) ≤ p, ∀p ∈ [0, 1].
Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002)[9] then Chateauneuf and Lakhnati (2007)[8]
have introduced a generalization of preference for perfect hedging which is called
preference for sure diversiﬁcation:
Deﬁnition 3.5.  exhibits preference for sure diversiﬁcation if for any X1, ..., Xn ∈
V ; α1, ..., αn ≥ 0 such that
∑n
i=1 αi = 1 and a ∈ IR
[X1 ∼ X2 ∼ ... ∼ Xn and
∑n
i=1 αiXi = a] ⇒ a  Xi, ∀i.
Chateauneuf and Lakhnati (2007)[8] have proved that this kind of preference
characterizes weak risk aversion.
3.2 Characterization of weak risk aversion
Let us now give some characterizations of weakly risk averse decision-makers.
Proposition 3.6. The following assertions are equivalent:
(a) A decision-maker is weakly risk averse.
(b) ∀W ∈ IR, ∀X ∈ V, pi(W,X) ≥ 0.
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(c) ∀W ∈ IR, ∀X ∈ V, s(W,X) ≤ E(X).
(d) ∀W ∈ IR, ∀X ∈ V, b(W,X) ≤ E(X).
(e) ∀W ∈ IR, ∀X ∈ V, a(W,X) ≥ E(X).
(f) ∀W ∈ IR, ∀X ∈ V, b(W,X) ≤ E(X) ≤ a(W,X).
Proof.
. (a)⇔ (b) is nothing else than property 2.4.
. (b)⇔ (c)
This equivalence holds easily by (1) of property 2.10.
. (c)⇔ (d)
For this let us prove ﬁrst that (c)⇒ (d) and then (d)⇒ (c).
. Let W ∈ IR and X ∈ V (c)⇒ s(W −b(W,X), X) ≤ E(X) which implies
thanks to property 3 b(W,X) ≤ E(X) then (c)⇒ (d) .
. let W ∈ IR and X ∈ V (d)⇒ b(W + s(W,X), X) ≤ E(X) which implies
thanks to property 4 s(W,X) ≤ E(X) then (d)⇒ (c) .
Therefore (c)⇔ (d).
. (d)⇔ (e)
∀X ∈ V, b(W,X) ≤ E(X)⇔∀X ∈ V, b(W,−X) ≤ E(−X)⇔∀X ∈ V, −b(W,−X) ≥
−E(−X).
But E(X) = −E(−X) and thanks to (2) in property 2.10 we have,
∀X ∈ V, −b(W,−X) ≥ −E(−X) ⇔ ∀X ∈ V, a(W,X) ≥ E(X) .
. (e)⇔ (f)
This equivalence holds easily because (d)⇔ (e).
By proposition 3.6, we see that weak risk aversion is enough to get a posi-
tive bid-ask spread. But it is not enough to have b(W,X) ≤ s(W,X) because
proposition 3.6 gives only s(W,X) ≤ EP (X) and b(W,X) ≤ EP (X).
Corollary 3.7.
If a decision-maker is weakly risk averse then ∀W ∈ IR, ∀X ∈ V, b(W,X) ≤
a(W,X).
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Remark 3.8. Note that the converse of corollary 3.7 is false. In Yaari's model for
example Abouda and Chateauneuf (2002)[1] have shown that ∀W ∈ IR, ∀X ∈ V
b(W,X) ≤ a(W,X) if and only if f(p)+ f(1− p) ≤ 1, ∀p ∈ [0, 1] which is weaker
than weak risk aversion characterized in this model by f(p) ≤ p, ∀p ∈ [0, 1].
For sake of completeness, in the EU model, positivity of the bid-ask spread is
equivalent to concavity of u (see, Abouda and Chateauneuf (2002)[1]) hence to
weak and strong risk aversion (see, for example Rothschild and Stiglitz(1970)[14]
and Cohen (1995)[10]).
4 Decreasing absolute risk aversion
Our main contribution here is that the theorems below are given independently
of any model and not only in expected utility model like in Arrow (1965)[4], Pratt
(1964)[13] and La Vallée (1968)[12].
We give now a characterization of decreasing absolute risk aversion :
Theorem 4.1.
The following assertions are equivalent:
(a) The decision-maker satisﬁes DARA
(b) The risk premium pi(W,X) is a decreasing function of W on IR for all non
trivial asset X ∈ V .
Let us give the same theorem for nonincreasing absolute risk aversion :
Theorem 4.2.
The following assertions are equivalent:
(a) The decision-maker satisﬁes NARA
(b) The risk premium pi(W,X) is a non increasing function of W on IR for all
X ∈ V .




Let us consider a non trivial asset X ∈ V and W ′ > W .
By deﬁnition 2.3 we have :
W +X ∼ W + E(X)− pi(W,X) (11)
W ′ +X ∼ W ′ + E(X)− pi(W ′, X) (12)
Set k = W ′ −W > 0. (a) and (11) give :
k +W +X  k +W + E(X)− pi(W,X)
i.e. W ′ +X  W ′ + E(X)− pi(W,X)
then by (12) we have W ′ + E(X)− pi(W ′, X)  W ′ + E(X)− pi(W,X)
thus pi(W ′, X) < pi(W,X)
. (b)⇒ (a)
Let us consider a non trivial asset X ∈ V and let k > 0.
Let C ∈ IR be the certainty equivalent of X : X ∼ C.
By deﬁnition 2.3 we have :
C = E(X)− pi(0, X) and k +X ∼ k + E(X)− pi(k,X).
(b) ⇒ pi(k,X) < pi(0, X) then E(X) − pi(k,X) > E(X) − pi(0, X) = C, hence
k + E(X)− pi(k,X) > C + k.
Thus X + k  C + k.
Remark 4.3. Thanks to (1) of property 2.10 we have:
The risk premium pi(W,X) is a non increasing (decreasing) function of W if and
only if the selling price s(W,X) is a non decreasing (increasing) function of W .
In other words, the decision maker satisﬁes NARA (DARA) if and only if the
selling price s(W,X) is a non decreasing (increasing) function of W .
Let us now prove the following theorem where it is shown that for favorable
assets, positivity (non negativity) of the bid-selling spread is characterized by
the decreasingness (non increasingness) of absolute risk aversion. Note that the
suﬃcient condition has been proved, in the expected utility model, by La Vallée
(1968)[12] and our contribution here is to show that it is also necessary.
Theorem 4.4.
The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) The decision-maker satisﬁes DARA
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(ii) ∀W ∈ IR and X ∈ V such that b(W,X) > 0 we have b(W,X) < s(W,X).
(iii) ∀W ∈ IR and X ∈ V such that b(W,X) < 0 we have s(W,X) < b(W,X).
Proof.
. (i)⇒ (ii)
Let us consider a non trivial asset X ∈ V and W ∈ IR such that b(W,X) > 0.
Suppose that (i) is true, then by remark 4.3 we have s(W,X) is an increasing
function of W hence :
s(W − b(W,X), X) < s(W,X) (13)
(3) of property 2.10 gives :
b(W,X) = s(W − b(W,X), X) (14)
(13) and (14) give b(W,X) < s(W,X) therefore (i)⇒ (ii).
. (ii)⇒ (iii)
Suppose that (ii) is true, and let us show that (iii) false is impossible.
Let W ∈ IR, X ∈ V such that b(W,X) < 0, and assume that
b(W,X) ≤ s(W,X) (15)
Set k = −b(W,X)− s(W,X). (15) gives :
b(W,X) + k ≤ s(W,X) + k (16)
hence from (6) and (7) of property 2.11
b(W,X + k) ≤ s(W − k,X + k) (17)
From (3) and (4) of property 2.10 one obtains :
s(W − b(W,X + k), X + k) ≤ b(W − k + s(W − k,X + k), X + k) (18)
12
since (6) and (7) of property 2.11 imply :
b(W,X + k) = b(W,X) + k and s(W − k,X + k) = s(W,X) + k
inserring the chosen value of k in (18) gives :
s(W + s(W,X), X + k) ≤ b(W + s(W,X), X + k) (19)
(7) of property 2.11 and (4) of property 2.10 give :
b(W + s(W,X), X + k) = b(W + s(W,X), X) + k
= s(W,X) + k
= −b(W,X)
b(W + s(W,X), X + k) > 0 (20)
(19) and (20) contradicts (ii) therefore (ii)⇒ (iii).
. (iii)⇒ (i)
Let us consider a non trivial asset X ∈ V and his certainty equivalent C ∈ IR :
X ∼ C (21)
Let k > 0 and W ∈ IR, be the certainty equivalent of X + k :
X + k ∼ W (22)
By deﬁning a new asset X ′ ∈ V : X ′ = X −W , we have
W +X ′ − (−k) = X + k (23)
(22), (23) and deﬁnition 2.7 give
b(W,X ′) = −k < 0 (24)
On the other hand W +X ′ = X and C = W + (C −W ), then by deﬁnition 2.8
and (21), we have :
s(W,X ′) = C −W (25)
(24), (25) and (iii) give C −W < −k i.e. W > C + k.
Thus from (22) we have X + k  C + k therefore (iii)⇒ (i).
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Remark 4.5. The case when b(W,X) = 0 is not interesting because, thanks to
(3) in property 2.10, we will have necessary s(W,X) = 0.
On the other hand, we give now the same theorem but with nonincreasing
absolute risk aversion. Note that the proof is appreciably the same one as for
theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.6.
The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) The decision-maker satisﬁes NARA
(ii) ∀W ∈ IR and X ∈ V such that b(W,X) > 0 we have b(W,X) ≤ s(W,X).
(iii) ∀W ∈ IR and X ∈ V such that b(W,X) < 0 we have s(W,X) ≤ b(W,X).
Theorems 4.4 and 4.6 are strongly related with the fact that the more the
decision maker is rich the more he appreciates risk.
After buying an asset the decision maker will have : W − b(W,X) + X, let us
note this the ﬁrst situation. The second situation will be before selling the asset
when the decision maker has : W +X.
When b(W,X) > 0, W − b(W,X) < W , the second situation is clearly more
favorable than the ﬁrst one and this seems to be the reason why the decision
maker accepts more easily the risk in the second situation than in the ﬁrst. This
explains why when the decision maker satisﬁes DARA or NARA, the selling price
is greater than the buying one.
On the other hand, for unfavorable assets, the second situation will be less favor-
able than the ﬁrst one and this seems to be the reason why he accepts more easily
the risk in the ﬁrst situation than in the second and this explains why when the
decision maker satisﬁes DARA or NARA, the buying price exceeds the selling
one.
5 Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper is to characterize independently of any model
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) in terms of risk premium and in terms
of positivity of the bid-selling spread. We do not have restrictive assumptions,
as in La Vallée (1968)[12], such as the expected utility hypothesis and the twice
diﬀerentiability of the utility function.
14
Acknowledgement
Helpful discussions and comments given by Mark Machina are gratefully acknowl-
edged.
References
[1] Abouda, M. and Chateauneuf, A. (2002). Positivity of bid-ask spreads and
symmetrical monotone risk aversion. Theory and Decision, 52, 149-170.
[2] Abouda, M. and Chateauneuf, A. (2002). A characterization of the sym-
metrical monotone risk aversion in the RDEU model. Mathematical Social
Sciences, 44, 1-15.
[3] Allais, M., (1953). Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque:
critique des postulats et axiomes de l'école américaine. Econometrica, 21,
503-546.
[4] Arrow, K.J. (1965). The theory of risk aversion, Chapter 2 of Aspects of the
Theory of Risk Bearing. Helsinki, Yrjo Jahnsonin, Saatio.
[5] Bernoulli, D. (1738). Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis. Commen-
tarii Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae 5, 175-192. English
translation by L. Sommer (1954): Exposition of a new theory on the mea-
surement of risk. Econometrica 22, 23-36.
[6] Biais, B. (1993). Price Formation and Equilibrium Liquidity in Fragmented
and Centralized Markets. Journal of Finance, 48, 157-185.
[7] Chateauneuf, A. Mimeo notes on Decision Under Uncertainty. Université de
Paris I.
[8] Chateauneuf, A. and Lakhnati, G. (2007) From sure to strong diversiﬁcation.
Economic theory. 32, No. 3, 511-522.
[9] Chateauneuf, A. and Tallon, J.M. (2002). Diversiﬁcation, convex preferences
and non-empty core in the Choquet expected utility model. Economic The-
ory, 19, 509-523.
15
[10] Cohen, M. (1995). Risk aversion concepts in expected and non-expected
utility models. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance theory, 20, 73-91.
[11] Jensen (1967). An introduction to Bernouillan utility theory : (I) Utility
function. Swedish Journal of Economics, 69, 163-183.
[12] La Vallée, I. (1968). On Cash Equivalence and Information Evaluation in
Decision under and Uncertainty, part I, II and III. Journal of The American
Statistical Association, 63, 252-290.
[13] Pratt, J. (1964).Risk Aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica,
32,No. 1, 122-136
[14] Rothschild, M., and Stiglitz J. (1970). Increasing Risk: I. A deﬁnition. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 2, 225-243.
[15] von Neumann J. and Morgenstern (1947). Theory of Games and Economic
Behaviour. Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ.
[16] Yaari, M. E. (1987). The dual theory of choice under risk. Econometrica, 55,
95-115.
16
